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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, as 
Trustees of the Donald and Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/a March 2, 2015, ("Schoorls") argued that 
Idaho's adverse possession statutes-including the limitations periods contained therein-were 
substantive and amendments thereto could not be retroactively applied. From there, Schoorls 
further argued that the limitations period contained in the statute in effect at the time a cause of 
action for ejectment accrued, i.e., the date that the adverse possession commenced, was the 
limitations period that governed adverse possession rights. Schoorls supported both points with 
argument and authority from Idaho and sister jurisdictions. 
In response, Guild ignored the argument and authority presented by Schoorls and 
provided, instead, a conclusory reformulation of the issue: since the adverse possession right 
was not fully vested, it could not be substantive. From there, Guild simply provided authority 
that supported this conclusory presumption. 
The precise question to be decided in this case, however, is whether a right that is not 
fully vested, but which is in progress, can be considered substantive. Because Guild did not 
address whether a right that is not fully vested can be considered substantive, most of its 
argument and authority speak to an issue or dispute that is not before this Court. For the 
following reasons, Schoorls respectfully request that this Court reject the largely non-responsive 
argument and authority presented by Guild and, instead, focus on the issues presented by this 
appeal so as to reach the conclusions that (i) where a party has undertaken actions pursuant to 
substantive laws, amendments to those substantive laws may not be retroactively applied (unless 
the legislature expressly declares so) and (ii) the limitations period controlling a right of adverse 
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possession is the limitations period in place when a claim for ejectment accrues: the date 
adverse possession commences. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Guild incorrectly frames the issue to be decided by this Court and, accordingly, 
much of its argument is directed at matters that are not before this Court for 
decision. 
Throughout its brief, Guild incorrectly articulates the issue to be decided. Guild states 
that the issue is whether Schoorls "acquired a vested real property right in the Property as of July 
1, 2006." Resp. Br. at 3. That articulation is inaccurate. Rather, the issue to be decided is 
whether, in November of 2001, Schoorls began engaging in actions pursuant to laws that "create, 
enlarge, diminish, or destroy" vested rights. If so, the laws pursuant to which Schoorls were 
acting were substantive laws and amendments thereto may not be applied retroactively. Because 
Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes do "create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy" 
vested rights, such statutes are considered substantive and, therefore, may not be retroactively 
applied. 
To be clear: There appears to be no dispute that the bar against retroactive legislation 
applies to only substantive rights. Additionally, there appears to be no dispute that fully vested 
rights are properly characterized as substantive rights. 
However, the point made by Schoorls is that substantive rights encompass more than just 
rights which are fully vested. Under Idaho law, rights that are in the process of vesting-though 
not yet fully vested-may also be properly characterized as substantive rights. Guild ignores this 
point entirely, choosing instead to focus on the undisputed: the adverse possession right was not 
fully vested. That point is not in dispute. The question presented, however, is whether the 
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commencement of adverse possession triggers the running of a substantive limitations period that 
cannot, thereafter, be amended. 
The Idaho case of Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct. App. 
1988) articulates clearly that the prohibition against retroactive application of legislation 
impacting substantive rights applies to laws that "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual 
or vested rights." By plain operation of the English language, if a law is one that "creates a 
vested right" the right itself is not yet vested; rather, it is vesting, it is being created. If a law is 
one that "destroys a vested right" the right itself is not yet destroyed; rather, it is divesting, it is 
being destroyed. Accordingly, logic and the dictates of the English language establish that a 
right does not have to be fully vested ( or fully destroyed) in order to be a substantive right; 
rather, rights that are being "created, enlarged, diminished or destroyed" are also properly 
characterized as substantive rights. Respondents fail to address this distinction and, accordingly, 
much of their argument does not precisely address the matter at issue in this appeal. 
B. Guild's argument that the 20 year statute is not being retroactively applied rests 
upon the incorrect presumption that the at-issue limitations period is procedural or 
remedial. 
Throughout its brief, Guild frames its arguments around conclusions that are based on the 
presumption that the at-issue limitations period is not substantive. Since Guild is incorrect in this 
underlying presumption, much of its argument misses the mark. Specifically, Guild argues that 
the 20 year amendment to the limitations period contained in the ejectment and adverse 
possession statute is not being retroactively applied to the Schoorls adverse possession actions, 
but Guild's support for this argument fails to address the distinction between substantive 
limitations periods and remedial/procedural limitations periods. 
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In supporting its argument that the 20 year limitations period was not retroactively 
applied, Guild presents this Court with authority dealing only with remedial/procedural 
limitations periods and asks this Court to apply such authority blindly, without first giving 
consideration to the substantive nature of adverse possession and ejectment statutes-including 
the limitations periods contained therein. Again, there is no dispute that the authority cited by 
Guild regarding remedial or procedural limitations periods is correct insofar as it applies to 
remedial or procedural limitations periods. However, not all limitations periods operate the 
same. App. Br. at 7 (discussing cases recognizing the differences between procedural/remedial 
and substantive limitations periods). Because this case deals with a substantive limitations 
period, Guild's authority is simply inapplicable. 
The only attempt that Guild makes to address Schoorls' argument that the limitations 
periods pertaining to adverse possession and ejectment statutes are substantive, is found in a 
short and somewhat cryptic footnote 3 on page 9 of Guild's Brief. In that footnote, Guild asserts 
that "an ejectment action was an action recognized by the common law" ( citing Burke v. 
McDonald, 2 Hasb. 339, 359 (Idaho 1887)) and, from there, claims that "any extension of any 
accrued right to eject Schoorls from the Property would not be considered a substantive change, 
but a remedial change .... " Guild cites no authority to support its conclusion. Again, Guild's 
unsupported analysis and the conclusion drawn therefrom misunderstands the historical 
development of actions for ejectment and the acquisition of title by adverse possession. 
Guild's footnote correctly recognizes that there was a common law right for a landowner 
to bring an action to recover possession of his property. Critically, however, at common law 
there was no time limit for doing so and the failure to do so did not vest legal title in said 
property in the adverse possessor. 
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As noted in Schoorls' opening brief, a historical discussion of the development of adverse 
possession jurisprudence is found in J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 
766 A. 2d 1110 (2001). To summarize the key points: "At common law the right of a 
landowner to reenter and retake possession was not restricted by time limits and was different 
from an ejectment action." Id. at 503 (emphasis added). "As society evolved and it became 
unclear whether there were any time constraints on when an owner had to retake possession, it 
became necessary to require people to assert claims to retake possession within a reasonable 
time." Id. Through the development of statutory ejectment actions-imposing upon the owner 
of property a time certain in which they had to act in order to recover possession of their 
property-the statutory counterpart, adverse possession statutes, came into being. "The common 
law did not recognize a transference of title through adverse possession. 'Such seemed to be 
oppugnant to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law."' Id. at 1113-14 ( quoting 
Predham v. Ho{fester, 32 N.J. Super. 419,421, 108 A.2d 458 (App. Div. 1954)). 
By imposing statutory time limits, legislatures created the right to obtain title to land 
through adverse possession (and the corresponding risk of losing land through failure to timely 
assert one's rights). Stated differently: the right to obtain title through adverse possession did 
not exist until statutes were enacted imposing time limits within which an owner was required to 
bring an ejectment action or lose title to their property. Adverse possession and ejectment 
statutes are the quintessential example of a statutorily created right and, moreover, a right that is 
based almost entirely 1 on the limitations period contained within the applicable statute. To 
1 A party acquiring title by adverse possession is required to undertake certain specified actions in order for their possession to ripen into title. Under Idaho law, those requirements include possession that is open and notorious for the specified length of time. If the legislative amendment had added some type ofadditional requirement-such as the posting of signs specifically informing the world that the adverse possessor was attempting to acquire title by 
adverse possession-it would certainly be a retroactive application of the statute to make someone 4.9 years into their adverse possession start over in accordance with the new requirements. Because the limitations periods 
contained within the statute are part and parcel with the other statutory requirements, it is equally a retroactive 
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change the limitations period is to change the very substance of the statute creating the right. 
Guild fails to address this authority and, other than the short reference contained in footnote 3 on 
page 9, makes no effort to convince this Court that Schoorls' characterization of the statute of 
limitations period as substantive is an incorrect characterization. 
C. Guild's reliance on New York case law is misplaced because the enacting legislation 
specifically provided that it shall be applied to all claims filed on or after the 
effective date of the act. 
Guild relies on New York case law to support its position that a "non-ripened" adverse 
possession action (i.e., adverse possession that has not lasted for the full statutory period) may 
properly be modified by legislative amendment. Resp. Br. at 13-14. In support of its argument, 
Guild cites cases wherein the New York Court of Appeals confirmed that the legislative 
amendments2 did not apply to fully ripened adverse possession claims (Pritsiolas v. Apple 
Bankcorp. Inc., 120 A.D. 3d 647,649 992 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (2014) and 5262 Kings Highway, LLC v. 
Nadia Dev., LLC, 121 A.D. 3d 748, 749 994 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (2014) but affirmed decisions that 
did apply legislative amendments to non-ripened claims (Reyes v. Carroll, 137 A.D.3d 886, 887-
88 27 N.Y.S. 3d 80 (2016). 
Critically, however, the New York statute enacting these changes expressly provided that 
they were to be applied retroactively: "This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to 
claims filed on or after such effective date." 2008 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 269 (S. 7915-
C) (McKinney's) § 9 (emphasis added) (attached hereto for the Court's convenience as 
application of the statute to make someone 4.9 years (or 90%) into their adverse possession period continue the 
statutorily required conduct for 4x's longer than the period that existed when they began adversely possessing the property. 
2 The at-issue amendments did not involve limitations periods but, rather, appear to be clarifications regarding 
certain terminology used within the adverse possession statute and the proof required to establish the requisite 
elements of adverse possession. As noted in footnote I, however, it is Schoorls' position that all requirements ofan adverse possession statute are substantive (including the limitations periods) and, accordingly, changes to any portion of an adverse possession statute should be subject to the same rules regarding retroactive application. 
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Appendix 1 ). Because the New York legislature specifically required that the amendments were 
to be applied to all claims filed after the effective date of the amendment, New York case law 
does not help answer the question before this Court. Significantly, the Idaho legislature did not 
provide any similar legislation requiring retroactive application of the amendments to Idaho's 
adverse possession statutes. 
D. The Idaho Supreme Court has never Applied Idaho Code Section 73-107 in 
the Manner Advanced by Guilds. 
In more than 135 years since Idaho Code Section 73-107 has been in effect, this Court 
has not once applied it in the manner that Guild asks this Court to apply it today. In fact, it does 
not appear as though any Idaho court of appellate review has ever relied on Section 73-107 to 
support any decision. Indeed, if Idaho Code Section 73-107 applies in the manner advanced by 
Guild, such a holding would overturn by implication the entirety of this Court's jurisprudence 
holding that the limitations period in place at the time a cause of action accrues governs the 
action. 
To the extent that this Court is inclined, for the first time in 135 years, to rely upon Idaho 
Code Section 73-107 for purposes of determining this appeal, it is possible to reconcile some of 
the prior decisions with the language of 73-107 by acknowledging the distinction between 
procedural/remedial limitations periods and substantive limitations periods. As noted previously, 
substantive limitations periods are those limitations periods that are so much a part of the rights 
created ( or destroyed) that the limitations periods themselves create ( or destroy) the right. 
Hemingway v. Shull articulates the distinction aptly: 
A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions 
which are annexed to a right of action created by statute. A statute 
which in itself creates a new liability, gives an action to enforce it 
unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within which that 
action may be commenced, is not a statute of limitations. It is a 
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statute of creation, and the commencement of the action within 
the time it fixes is an indispensable condition of the liability and of 
the action which it permits. The time element is an inherent 
element of the right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is 
a limitation of the right. 
286 F. Supp. 243, 246 (D.S.C. 1968) (dealing with statutory wrongful death actions) (emphasis 
added). 
In order to avoid the confusion that arises when the term "limitations" period is applied to 
substantive acts, recognizing these acts as "statutes of creation" or "statutes of destruction" 
acknowledges the important distinction between substantive limitations periods and procedural 
or remedial limitations periods. Moreover, acknowledging substantive limitations periods are 
more appropriately thought of as "statutes of creation" or "statutes of destruction" is consistent 
with Idaho's jurisprudence holding that substantive laws are those that "create, enlarge, diminish, 
or destroy" vested rights and amendments thereto cannot be retroactively applied. 
E. Guild has failed to give this Court adequate authority upon which it can or should 
distinguish our sister jurisdictions' application of legislative amendments to adverse 
possession statutes. 
In their opening brief, Schoorls cite two cases from sister jurisdictions where the 
limitations period in ejectment and adverse possession cases was amended. App. Br. at 9 (Citing 
Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 148 Wis.2d 762,768,436 N.W.2d 880,882 (1989) and Lyles v. 
Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E. 334 (1889). Both cases involved a shortening of the limitations 
period, rather than the lengthening that occurred in this case. Id However, in both cases, the 
respective courts properly reached the conclusion that the deciding factor for determining which 
limitations period applied was the date the adverse possession commenced. Id. Guild's attempt 
to distinguish these cases fails to address the underlying rationale that controlled the respective 
decisions. Moreover, because the underlying rationale that controlled the respective decisions is 
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consistent with Idaho case law that holds that the limitations period in place at the time the cause 
of action accrues should be applied, the Petropoulos and Lyles decisions are very persuasive and 
should guide this Court's decision. 
1. Guild has not provided good authority establishing that the rationale underlying 
the Roach decision is no longer good law. 
With respect to its attack on the Roach decision, Guild argues that the South Carolina 
decision is antiquated law and no longer any good, even in South Carolina. In support of this, 
Guild relies on Cannon v. Johnson, Lane, Space. Smith & Company, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 724 
(D.S.C. 1987), a decision from the Federal District Court in and for the district of South Carolina 
dealing with amendment to limitations periods in South Carolina's blue-sky laws. There is no 
authority supporting Guild's position that a case decided by a federal court sitting in its Erie 
capacity and deciding an issue relating to South Carolina blue-sky laws overturns a prior 
decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina relating to the application of amended 
limitations period in adverse possession statutes. To the extent Guild argues as much, it is asking 
this Court to stretch Cannon further than permissible. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
Guild's argument that the rationale underlying the Roach decision is no longer good law and 
would not be followed in South Carolina today. 
2. Guild has not provided good authority establishing that the rationale underlying 
the Petropoulos decision is different than rationale applied in Idaho. 
In an effort to distinguish the conclusions reached by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 148 Wis. 2d 762, 436 N.W. 2d 880 (Ct. App. 1989) from the 
conclusion that Schoorls ask this Court to reach here, Guild cites to the differences between 
Idaho Code § 73-107 as compared to W.S.A. § 990.06. Critically, however-just like Idaho's 
courts of appellate review have never relied on 73-107 to support decisions that apply the 
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limitations period in effect at the time a cause of action accrues-in Petropoulos the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court also did not rely on W.S.A. § 990.06 to support its decision that the statute in 
effect at the time the adverse possession began was the controlling statute. Rather, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, like the South Carolina Supreme Court in Roach, rested its decision 
on principles similar to those that have been embraced by the Idaho Supreme Court: the statute 
that is in effect when a cause of action arises is the governing statute. 
Of particular importance to this case is our conclusion that adverse 
possession statutes have prospective application only, and will not 
be given a retrospective application. They apply where possession 
is taken after the laws have gone into effect, and compliance with 
their provisions is necessary to obtain the benefit therefrom. 
Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 148 Wis.2d 762,767,436 N.W. 2d 880 (Ct. App. 1989). The 
Court goes on to note that the applicable limitations provision is the one that was in place when 
the adverse possession commenced: "The key date in this case is May 13, 1955. At that time, 
Petropoulos' predecessors had notice that the City sought to reclaim the basement area under 
Greenfield Avenue." Id. at 768. The Roach Court articulated similar rationale: 
"Whenever there is a plaintiff who can sue and a defendant who 
can be sued the statute begins to run. A right of action has 
accrued" ( citation omitted) and the limitation in force at the accrual 
of the right is the limitation which must govern. 
Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E.334 (1889). 
But it will be observed that the action of the plaintiff is for the 
recovery of the possession of the land, and the right of action for 
such possession accrued, first, when he was illegally deprived of possession, and, if that deprivation has continued, there has not been a second cause created thereby, but the first has continued; 
and, the currency of the statute being set in motion by the accrual 
of the first, the time must be estimated from that period, and 
according to the provisions of the act of assembly then of force. 
Id. As these excerpts indicate, the rationale underlying the decisions in both Roach and 
Petropoulis are consistent with Idaho's jurisprudence: the statute in effect at the time a cause of 
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action arises is the controlling statute. What these cases add to the analysis-which is not found 
in any Idaho decisional law-is that the controlling accrual date for determining which 
limitations period applies is the date that the property O\\.Tier has a claim for ejectment: the date 
that the adverse possession commenced. 
3. Guild has not provided good authority supporting its position that results 
oriented decision favoring a longer limitations period should guide question of 
whether a statutory amendment should apply to adverse possession and 
ejectment claims. 
With respect to both the Roach and Petropoulis decisions, Guild notes the fact that those 
cases involved amendments shortening the limitations period rather than lengthening the 
limitations period. Guild has not provided any authority supporting the proposition that, when 
dealing with substantive limitations periods, Courts should be guided by a results oriented 
conclusion favoring a shortened vs. lengthened limitations period. The authority upon which 
Guild does rely in support of its proposition that a longer limitations period is preferred-
Cannon v. Johnson, Lane, Space, Smith & Company, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 724 (D.S.C. 1978) 
(Resp. Br. at 10) and State v. O'Niell, 118 Idaho 224,247,796 P.2d 121, 124 (1990) (Resp. Br. 
at 17)--each deal with the imposition of liability for wrongdoing in either the context of civil 
blue-sky laws (Cannon) or criminal liability ( 0 'Niel!). 
Neither Cannon nor O 'Niel! deal with limitations periods that create or destroy 
substantive rights, so their rationale does not apply to the case at hand. Moreover, contrary to 
Guild's suggestion that the principles espoused in O 'Niel! are applicable here (Resp. Br. at 17), 
this Court has expressly noted that different considerations are at play with respect to 
remedial/procedural limitations periods: "The shelter of a statute of limitations has never been 
regarded as a fundamental right, and the lapse of a statute of limitations does not endow a citizen 
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with a vested property right in immunity from suit." Hecla Min. Co. v Idaho State 
108 Idaho 147,150,697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1985) (quoting Starks v. SE Rykoff & Co., 673 F.2d 
1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982)). "These propositions are true because statutes of limitations involve 
matters of remedy, not destruction ofrights." Id. Conversely, in this case, the limitations period 
at issue does involve the destruction (and creation) of a valuable, substantive right: a property 
right. Accordingly, Guild's reliance on authority speaking to procedural or remedial limitations 
periods is, therefore, misplaced. 
In short, Guild has not given this Court good authority demonstrating that the rationale 
underlying the decisions in Petropoulos and Roach is incorrect or inconsistent with Idaho law. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in Schoorls' opening brief at 9 and 10, this authority is consistent with 
Idaho law that provides that the statute of limitations that applies to an action is the limitations 
period in place at the time the cause of action accrues3• For purposes of adverse possession 
claims, that date is the date the owner has a cause of action for ejectment; i.e., the date the 
adverse possession commenced. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the Schoorls respectfully request that this Court hold that (i) the 
limitations periods governing adverse possession and ejectment actions are matters of 
substantive law and amendments thereto may not be retroactively applied and (ii) the limitations 
period governing a right of adverse possession is the limitations period in effect at the time the 
cause of action for ejectment accrued: i.e., the date adverse possession commenced. Based upon 
3 Some confusion is created when using the terminology of the "accrual" of a cause of action for adverse possession because a cause of action for ''adverse possession" does not accrue in the normal sense of the word. Rather, after the 
record owner of the property fails to exercise its right to eject the adverse possessor from the property, title ripens in the adverse possessor automatically and by operation of law. Accordingly, to avoid such confusion, it is more appropriate to conceptualize a fully ripened adverse possession claim as a "right to title by adverse possession" 
rather than an "accrual of a cause of action." 
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such holdings, the Schoorls respectfully request that this Court reverse and remand this matter 
for proceedings consistent with such opinion. 
Dated this 14th day of July, 2016. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
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AN ACT to amend the real property actions and proceedings law. in relation to adverse possession 
The People of the State of New York. represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows: 
s I. Section 501 of the real property actions and proceedings law, as added by chapter 312 of the laws of 1962, is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 501 >> 
§ 501. Action after entry. An entry upon real property is not sufficient or valid as a elttim unless ttn action is commenced 
thereupon within one yettr after the making thereof and within ten years after the time when the right to make it 
descended or accrued. Adverse possession; defined 
For the purposes of this article: 
1. Adverse possessor. A person or entity is an "adverse possessor" of real property when the person or entity occupies 
real property of another person or entity with or without knowledge of the other's superior ownership rights, in a manner 
that would give the owner a cause of action for ejectment. 
2. Acquisition of title. An adverse possessor gains title to the occupied real property upon the expiration of the statute 
of limitations for an action to recover real property pursuant to subdivision (a) of section two hundred twelve of the 
civil practice law and rules, provided that the occupancy, as described in sections five hundred twelve and five hundred 
twenty-two of this article, has been adverse, under claim of right, open and notorious, continuous, exclusive, and actual. 
3. Claim of right. A claim of right means a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse 
possessor or property owner, as the case may be. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, claim ofright shall 
not be required if the owner or owners of the real property throughout the statutory period cannot be ascertained in 
the records of the county clerk, or the register of the county, of the county where such real property is situated, and located by reasonable means. 
§ 2. Section 511 of the real property actions and proceedings law, as added by chapter 312 of the laws of 1962. is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 511 >> 
§ 511. Adverse possession under written instrument or judgment 
Where the occupant or those under whom he the occupant claims entered into the possession of the premises under 
claim of ti:tle right, exclusive of any other right, founding the claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of 
the premises in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and there has been a continued occupation 
and possession of the premises included in the instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part thereof, for ten years, 
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under the same claim, the premises so included are deemed to have been held adversely; except that when they consist of 
a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot. 
§ 3. Section 512 of the real property actions and proceedings law, as added by chapter 312 of the laws of 1962, is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 512 >> 
§ 512. Essentials of adverse possession under written instrument or judgment 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming a title , founded upon a written instrument 
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in cit-her any of the following cases: 
1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved there has been acts sufficiently open to put a reasonably diligent 
owner on notice. 
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inelosure enclosure, except as provided in subdivision one of section 
five hundred forty-three of this article. 
3. Where, although not inclosed enclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, either for the 
purposes of husbandry or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, the portion of the farm or lot that has been left not 
cleared or not inelosed enclosed. according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, is deemed to have 
been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated. 
§ 4. Section 52 l of the real property actions and proceedings law. as amended by chapter 116 of the laws of 1965, is 
amended to read as follows: 
<<NYRPACT&PRO§~l>> 
* 521. Adverse possession ttflder claim of title not written not under written instrument or judgment 
Where there has been an actual continued occupation of premises under a claim of title right, exclusive of any other 
right, but not founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree. the premises so actually occupied, and no 
others, are deemed to have been held adversely. 
§ 5. Section 522 of the real property actions and proceedings law. as added by chapter 312 of the laws of I 962, is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 522 >> 
§ 522. Essentials of adverse possession tmder claim of title not written not under written instrument or judgment 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument 
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in either of the following cases, and no 
others: 
l. Where it h11s been usually cultivated or improved there have been acts sufficiently open to put a reasonably diligent 
owner on notice. 
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure enclosure, except as provided in subdivision one of section 
five hundred forty-three of this article. 
§ 6. Section 531 of the real property actions and proceedings law, as amended by chapter 375 of the laws of 1975. is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 531 >> 
§ 53 l. Adverse possession, how affected by relation of landlord and tenant 
Where the relation of landlord and tenant has existed bct\.vcen any p~ , the possession of the tenant is deemed 
the possession of the landlord until the expiration of ten years after the termination of the tenancy; or, where there has 
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been no written lease, until the expiration of ten years after the last payment of rent; notwithstanding that the tenant has 
acquired another title or has claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But this presumption shall cease after the periods 
prescribed in this section and such tenant may then commence to hold adversely to his landlord. § 7. Section 541 of the real property actions and proceedings law, as amended by chapter 375 of the laws of 1975, is 
amended to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 541 >> 
§ 541. Adverse possession, how affected by relation of tenants in common 
Where the relation of tenants in common has existed between any persons , the occupancy of one tenant, personally 
or by his servant or by his tenant, is deemed to have been the possession of the other, notwithstanding that the tenant so 
occupying the premises has acquired another title or has claimed to hold adversely to the other. But this presumption shall 
cease after the expiration of ten years of continuous exclusive occupancy by such tenant, personally or by his servant or 
by his tenant. or immediately upon an ouster by one tenant of the other and such occupying tenant may then commence 
to hold adversely to his cotenant. 
§ 8. The real property actions and proceedings law is amended by adding a new section 543 to read as follows: 
<< NY RP ACT & PRO§ 543 >> 
§ 543. Adverse possession; how affected by acts across a boundary line 
* 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the existence of de minimus non-structural encroachments 
including, but not limited to, fences, hedges, shrubbery, plantings, sheds and non-structural walls, shall be deemed to 
be permissive and non-adverse. 
* So in original. ("'de minimus" should be "de minimis".) 
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the acts of lawn mowing or similar maintenance across the 
boundary line of an adjoining landowner's property shall be deemed permissive and non-adverse. 
<< Note: NY RP ACT &PRO§§ SOL 511,512.521, 522. 531,541 >> 
<< Note: NY RP ACT & PRO§ 543 >> 
§ 9. This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to claims filed on or after such effective date. 
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